From wikipeida

Agreements to arbitrate were not enforceable at common law. This rule has been traced back to dictum by Lord Coke in Vynor's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609), that agreements to arbitrate were revocable by either party.

During the Industrial Revolution, merchants became increasingly opposed to this rule. They argued that too many valuable business relationships were being destroyed through years of expensive adversarial litigation, in courts whose rules differed significantly from the informal norms and conventions of businesspeople. Arbitration was promoted as being faster, less adversarial, and cheaper.

The result was the New York Arbitration Act of 1920, followed by the United States Arbitration Act of 1925 (now known as the Federal Arbitration Act). Both made agreements to arbitrate valid and enforceable (unless one party could show fraud or unconscionability or some other ground for rescission which undermined the validity of the entire contract). Due to the subsequent judicial expansion of the meaning of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the FAA in a series of cases in the 1980s and 1990s to cover almost the full scope of interstate commerce. In the process, the Court held that the FAA preempted many state laws covering arbitration, some of which had been passed by state legislatures to protect their workers and consumers against powerful business interests. Starting in 1991 with the Gilmer decision arbitration expanded dramatically in the employment context, growing from 2.1 percent of employees subject to mandatory arbitration clauses in 1992[3] to 53.9% in 2017.[4]